
Post-Quantum dApp
PQ Permit
Gasless token approvals signed with ML-DSA-87, because EVM windows protect transactions, not signatures.
About
QoreChain admits an EVM transaction only with an ML-DSA-87 key and an open window, so a leaked ECDSA key can't send anything. But EIP-2612 permit is checked with ecrecover: a leaked key signs a permit offline and an attacker relays it. We proved this live: a victim with EVM nonce 0 was drained. PQ Permit replaces those signatures with ML-DSA-87. The owner approves once inside a scoped window (1 tx, token only); after that, approvals are human-readable QoreSign messages verified on chain with pqcVerify against the owner's possession-proven key, relayable by anyone. Live on testnet: ECDSA permit rejected, an attacker's ML-DSA key rejected, the leaked-key transfer refused by the chain, the real permit works, and a replay is rejected. 29 Foundry tests on real ML-DSA-87 (including stateful invariants) via our open-source kit pqc-forge; findings from an independent pre-audit review fixed.
How it's made
Solidity (OpenZeppelin 5.4), Foundry, and pqc-forge (our kit: Foundry mocks of the precompiles running real FIPS-204 ML-DSA-87 via ffi, matched to live-chain behaviour). Live run with @qorechain/sdk and viem (live/). QCAI audit: docs/AUDIT.md and docs/audit/. Threat model: docs/THREAT_MODEL.md. Built with Claude Code; see AI_USAGE.md.
Timeline
New project.
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