About
Most DAOs rest on one assumption: their members’ ECDSA keys are safe. A quantum computer can recover an ECDSA private key from its public key, and every member who has ever sent a transaction has exposed theirs. On that day an attacker can vote as any member, pass any proposal and empty the treasury. Conclave is a DAO on QoreChain where every action that moves money or changes who is in charge needs an ML-DSA-87 post-quantum signature. The contract checks it with the pqcVerify precompile, against the key each member registered on chain. Payouts, adding or removing members, and rule changes all go through proposals that pass only on post-quantum votes. Members sign their votes in QoreX with no gas, and a relayer limited by a scoped EVM window submits them. The worst a stolen classical key can do is pause the treasury. It can never vote, approve or withdraw, and unpausing takes a post-quantum vote.
How it's made
Members: each member must have a registered ML-DSA-87 key. The contract reads that key from the chain with pqcKeyStatus(member) and never accepts a public key the user supplies. That’s the most important security rule. Propose: a member proposes a payout or a settings change. This is a normal transaction and harmless on its own. Vote: the member signs a plain-text message in QoreX ("Conclave v1 / action: vote / support / proposal / proposal hash / member / dao / chain"). The contract rebuilds the exact bytes QoreX signed ("qorechain-msg-v1|qorechain-diana|" + message) and checks them with pqcVerify against the member's registered key. Execute: after the quorum is reached and the timelock has passed, the treasury pays out. Scoped EVM window: the relayer account opens a window with allowedTargets = [Conclave], a small maxTxs and a capped maxValue. On testnet, show one call to Conclave going through and one call to another address being refused.
Timeline
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